SafeBreach Labs
Elite Team of Offensive Cybersecurity Experts
Our research teams are dedicated to maintaining the SafeBreach platform at maximum potential. They achieve this by arming the platform with the industry-leading SafeBreach Hacker’s Playbook of attack methods, which our researchers work constantly to expand and strengthen. SafeBreach Labs externally monitors the hacker underground, sources intelligence feeds and collaborates with external security research teams. We are dedicated to providing the latest attack methods to our customers and we uphold a 24-hour SLA on adding attacks identified from US Cert Alerts.
SafeBreach Labs researchers continuously identify new attack methods - before hackers discover them - as part of our research and development effort to “simulate a hacker”. This research is shared with the security community at leading conferences such as Black Hat, RSA and DEFCON.
We also contribute techniques to MITRE ATT&CK Framework.
We uphold a 24-hour SLA on adding attacks identified from US Cert Alerts.
Research Team Leader
Tomer Bar is a hands on security researcher leading security groups in the last fifteen-teen years for the government and in the private sector. He presented his research work on BlackHat, Defcon and Sector conferences.
Cyber warfare has long become a common practice in the arsenal of governments, armies, and intelligence agencies around the world. Iran is no exception to this trend, with new discoveries made every year repeatedly attributed to the Islamic republic.
SafeBreach Labs’ researchers consider whether a StuxNet 2.0 is possible, and discover that trusted patches a decade old may provide only an illusion of security.
A deep dive into two of the 58 Microsoft vulnerability patches in this month’s release: CVE-2020-17140 Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability - and - CVE-2020-17092 - Windows Network Connections Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
SafeBreach Labs added 13 new methods to address a massive new Russian-origin exploit; perpetrators stole the digital certificate for SolarWinds Orion software, then deployed malware into US Government agencies and to companies globally.
Invented in 2005, this technique is highly relevant today. We delve into and demystify attack variants that work against present-day web servers and HTTP proxy servers.
A decade after StuxNet, the Windows Print Spooler mechanism has yet more surprises. We explored two specific vulnerabilities that were recently patched - then had to be patched again.